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Response
Ruth A. Solie
Smith College
- I’m deeply humbled to read these accounts, and filled with admiration
at my colleagues’ persistence and commitment in these situations,
which are frightening and (or so I imagine) existentially exhausting.
I used to have these experiences, or variants of them, some years ago
when I regularly taught women’s studies; but routinely now in
my music fundamentals or music “appreciation” classroom
they don’t come up.
- As I read the participants’ thoughtful essays I was assailed
by dozens of reactions and responses, but I’ll use my word budget
here to talk about only one of them. It has to do with the nature of
the “teaching moment” that these controversies offer us.
(I realize that the recasting of crises as opportunities is cold comfort
when your classroom is in eruption but, as all of these writers recognize,
such they nonetheless are!) The lesson I would most want to convey has
to do with “moral relativism”—a highly suspicious
term in today’s morally self-righteous society, I know—not
only as a solution to an emergency but because students need to learn
to think in such relativistic terms anyway, if they are going to deal
with even non-controversial historical material.
- Every historical actor lives within a moral landscape in which certain
courses of action—and not others—are available. I think
students deserve help in understanding that those choices are not necessarily
the same ones that confront us, and that past choices and actions do
not necessarily look the same to us as they looked to those who made
them. A good historian has to evaluate subjects’ behaviors in
terms of the truly available options, and the horizon of evaluation
that contemporaries truly applied.
- The reason I find this lesson so utterly important is that I think
of history as a form of multiculturalism, another type of diversity,
another object-lesson in displacing ourselves from the center of an
always-and-everywhere universe. As the otherwise-forgotten novelist
L.P. Hartley famously wrote, “The past is a foreign country; they
do things differently there.” I have often been deeply frustrated
and angered, for example, by the fatal ease with which feminist theory’s
probing of social structures can devolve into a pounce of historical
“gotcha!” without any consideration of how the ethical and
moral issues may have looked to the actual characters involved, or why
they looked so, although this is surely the heart and soul of historical
endeavor.
- Can thinking about this help to defuse some of the excess affect
in the classroom? To deflect the floods of anger, anxiety, and shame
that arise so quickly and drown out efforts to think clearly? Let’s
try a prospective experiment: a friend of mine believes that, a century
from now, American society will condemn the keeping of domestic animals
as pets because it will be seen as a form of slavery. (When he first
told me this, I thought the notion was outlandish; but given the changes
in Americans’ attitudes toward their pets in just the last decade
or so it no longer really startles me.) Whether or not such a shift
in social mores seems reasonable at this point, it’s worth asking
students whether they are guilty of enslaving their pets now just because
people will think so in 2105?
- Here’s a concrete example with which I have been wrestling
for the last couple of years. I’ve been absorbed in Victorian
prose—fiction, history, journalism—and have very frequently
been disturbed by the confident, almost thoughtlessly easy, attribution
of character traits to national or ethnic groups (all called “races”
by the Victorians) that pepper their writing. How could such cosmopolitan
and sophisticated people have believed something so silly and so nasty
as racial essentialism? It turns out that this kind of characterization
was part and parcel of progressive thought: it was what mid- to late-Victorian
intellectuals believed that current science was teaching them, that
evolution progressed through the ever-ramifying fine distinctions of
speciation. If accused of unsavory racial (national, ethnic) “stereotyping”—not
an idea they would have recognized—they would surely have protested
that accurate taxonomy is the basis of all scientific knowledge. Are
these, then, villains?
- Needless to say—although it would probably be needful
to say in the classroom—I do not mean to suggest that historical
persons are to be exempt from judgment. On the contrary! Every time,
every place, has its spectrum of moral choices from the heroically virtuous
to the monstrously evil. The historian’s job, surely, is to understand
that spectrum and judge accordingly. It is part of what I personally
consider the single thing I most want to teach my students: not to overlay
others’ lives, or others’ musical experiences, with their
own.
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